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Abstract. As the primary protocol used to exchange routing information 
between network domains, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) plays a central role 
in the functioning of the Internet. Border Gateway Protocol is a standardized 
router protocol used to initiate and maintain communication between domains, 
or autonomous systems, on the Internet. This protocol can exhibit anomalous 
behavior caused by improper provisioning, malicious attacks, traffic or 
equipment failure, and network operator error. At large internet service 
providers, many BGP issues are not immediately seen or explicitly monitored 
by network operations centers. This possible blind spot is due to the enormous 
number of BGP handshakes that occur throughout the network along with the 
fact that there are many of these sub-interfaces associated to a single physical 
connection. We will present machine learning methods for anomaly detection 
using unsupervised learning techniques and discuss possible data pipeline 
methods to quickly collect and trigger on these anomalies when they occur. 
Clustering techniques including k-means and DBSCAN were successfully 
implemented and able to detect known anomalies for historical events. This 
approach could incur soft savings by triggering early detection warnings of 
anomalous BGP events, but human intervention may still be required in order to 
address possible false positives. 
1   Introduction 
At large Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is 
the most widely used exterior gateway routing protocol for domain peering. When 
establishing these peering connections, BGP exchanges routing and reachability 
information between domains or autonomous systems (AS) on the Internet. The 
handshake to initiate a BGP session is a finite state machine that transitions between 
six different states. The patterns to get from ‘idle’ to ‘established’ are not always the 
same and even repeat over and over in some cases. The timestamp, current and 
previous state, and other information related to BGP state changes are sent to router 
log servers as messages where they can be collected and analyzed. These interactions 
are reported as BGP neighbors periodically drop and reestablish, which makes this 
data available for network alarming perspective. [1]   
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Some examples of historical anomalies that affected BGP routing performance are 
listed below. Some of these were selected for to apply unsupervised learning to as 
they were massive scale events and easier to measure results. This project would 
attempt early detection of similar type events as some of these events reoccurred or 
continued to create havoc for many days as many of these were not detected and/or 
categorized in a timely manner.  
 
• TTNet announced more than 100,000 incorrect routes, 24 December 2004 
• TMNet BGP misconfiguration, 12 June 2015 
• AS27506 hijacked panix domain, 14 January 2005 
• Dodo ISP incident, 23 February 2012 
• Mosco blackout hardware failure, 7 May 2005 
• Worm attacks such as Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I 
 
The motivation for this project is to introduce soft savings associated with early 
detection and isolation of BGP events.  
 
• BGP can sometimes exhibit anomalous behavior caused by improper 
provisioning, malicious attacks, traffic or equipment failure, and network 
operator error.  
• At large service providers, many BGP issues are overlooked by network 
operations centers (NOC) because they are a logical sub-interface of a larger 
physical interface that stays intact (critical alarming occurs only on the 
physical interface). 
• BGP handshakes are constantly occurring so they are mostly ignored as 
normal operation based on high volume vs. low actual event incidence. 
 
It is possible to make use of BGP message logs as they are collected by applying 
machine learning techniques to detect anomalous behavior that could be network 
affecting. During this effort, false positives must be kept to a minimum as it is 
extremely important to not overload already busy operations center with useless 
information. [2] 
The simple problem definition is to find BGP anomalies and report them. The 
approach for this paper is to address the problem by implementing unsupervised 
clustering techniques to detect anomalies and iteratively apply them to datasets of 
multiple known events as a metric to measure against to determine optimal model(s) 
and parameterization. Once the optimal clustering method or combination thereof is 
determined along with parameterization, the next step is to implement a near real-time 
data flow to apply to continuous data collection.  
The process flow for model selection and parameterization is a static process based 
on historical data, and a near real-time data pipeline would effectively use the selected 
model and its parameters to constantly monitor BGP messages as they are collected. 
Some of the process step highlights are as follows:   
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 Fig. 1: Process Flow Diagram 
The upper box contains offline model selection and parameterization process. Once 
the optimal model(s) are selected and parameterized, they are testing by applying to 
historical known events. The final step is to apply model(s) to near real-time data 
collected every n minutes via scripted batch process. 
The flow of the upcoming sections of this document will begin with an informative 
BGP primer followed by related work examples. After that, the document will step 
through some of the process steps in Figure 1 as shown on the list below.  
 
1. Data collection and preparation.  
2. Model selection, parameterization, and testing. 
a. Results vs. historical event data. 
b. Different clustering techniques.  
3. Near real-time data flow pipelining overview.  
4. Conclusions. 
 
These steps imply the implementation of a data pipeline that collects, cleans, 
analyzes, and then triggers based on offline model creation applied to near real-time 
BGP data. Reproducible research during initial model creation (first three steps 
above) is essential to ensure production pipeline capability.  
Five historical events were selected, and clustering techniques including k-means 
and DBSCAN were successfully implemented and able to detect known anomalies for 
these events. False positives are still an issue during known historical ‘quiet times’, 
however, which would require human intervention. This approach could still incur 
soft savings (customer uptime satisfaction, labor reduction, latency, etc.), by sending 
a report of BGP anomaly event probabilities but is not yet capable of detecting 
anomalies without any false positives.     
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2   BGP Primer 
BGP has a long history that goes back to early 1980s. It was developed to help 
interconnected gateways to efficiently exchange routing information. These gateways 
connect different networks, and these networks are independently managed by their 
own administrative authorities, and they are called Autonomous System (AS). A 
typical enterprise network can have one or more AS numbers. Within an 
internetwork, such as an enterprise network, routers typically use Interior Routing 
Protocols. These routers are under the same administrative authority. Beyond these 
networks and at the border gateways, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used. An 
enterprise network connects upstream to a provider network, and the provider 
connects to high level providers, and now this becomes a network of networks. [3] 
BGP was introduced as a truly reliable dynamic routing protocol for inter-AS 
routing. It is classless and supports Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). It relies 
on TCP (port 179) for maintaining the neighboring relations with peer border gateway 
routers. The TCP mechanism efficiently handles activities such as handshakes, 
acknowledgement, retransmission and sequencing. Each pair of peers maintain a 
point-to-point session. [3] 
BGP is a vector protocol like RIP, and Each BGP node obtains routes from their 
downstream neighbors. It then processes and calculates its own routes. The results are 
then advertised to upstream neighbors. Its calculation bases on a path vector, and one 
of the path attributes is AS_PATH. The calculation is to find the shortest inter-AS 
path to reach the destination. 
BGP is a loop-free routing protocol. Route loops can be easily detected using 
AS_PATH attribute. 
In summary, BGP (version 4) is an interdomain routing protocol designed to 
provide loop-free routing links between organizations. RFC1771 introduced and 
discussed several new BGP features to allow the protocol to scale for internet use. 
Most Internet Service Providers use BGP as their border routers standard routing 
protocol. Organizations use BGP to connect to an external network such as provider 
network to gain access to the Internet. 
There are some unique characteristics about BGP: 
• BGP peers use a point-to-point unicast connection 
• BGP is an application layer protocol using TCP (port 179). Session 
maintenance comes from TCP functions such as acknowledgement, 
retransmission and sequencing 
• BGP is a path vector protocol using autonomous systems numbers 
• BGP routes uses a route attribute called AS_PATH, and list AS numbers in 
sequential set 
• The shortest path in the AS_PATH attribute determines the best path to the 
destination 
• The AS numbers on the AS_PATH helps detect any loop 
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2.1  BGP Messages 




Table 1. BGP Messages 
 
Type Name Function Overview 
OPEN Sets up and establishes BGP adjacency 
KEEPALIVE Ensures that BGP neighbors are still operating 
UPDATE Sends routing updates to peers 
NOTIFICATION Indicates an error condition to a BGP neighbor 
 
Due to data availability, this project will mainly focus on analyzing BGP update 
messages. Peers use update messages to synchronize routing tables. When one peer 
router has changes in its routing table, it will send an update message to inform the 
other router peer. The objective of using this message is to let other networks know 
about these network changes. Update message contains the feasible routes 
(announced), withdrawn routes or both. It also includes Network Layer Reachability 
Information (NLRI) and path attributes. Each update message only describes a single 
BGP path. 
2.2  Path Attributes 
A path attribute is a characteristic of an advertised BGP route and is included in the 
update message. It contains information about the destination such as next hop 
address. Path attributes are essential in BGP route calculation. Attribute usage of 
well-known mandatory indicates the attribute must be included in the BGP message 
or the session is closed (with a notification error generated). The optional attributes 
are passed along to other peers if transitive and simply ignored if nontransitive.  
 
Table 2. Path Attributes  
 
Attribute Name Attribute Usage 
ORIGIN Well-known mandatory 
AS_PATH Well-known mandatory 
NEXT_HOP Well-known mandatory 
LOCAL_PREF Well-known mandatory 
ATOMIC_AGGREGATE Well-known mandatory 
AGGREGATOR Optional transitive 
COMMUNITIES Optional transitive 
EXTENDED COMMUNITY Optional transitive 
MULTI_EXIT_DISC (MED) Optional nontransitive 
ORIFINATOR_ID Optional nontransitive 
CLUSTER_LIST Optional nontransitive 
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AS4_PATH Optional transitive 
AS4_AGGREGATOR Optional transitive 
Multiprotocol Reachable NLRI Optional transitive 
Multiprotocol Unreachable NLRI Optional transitive 
 
Optional transitive – If the attribute is not recognized by the BGP implementation but 
the transitive flag is set the attribute should be accepted and passed along to other 
peers.  
Optional non-transitive – If the attribute is not recognized by the BGP implementation 
but the transitive flag is not set the attribute should be ignored and not passed on to 
other peers. 
2.3  BGP Session Establishment 
There are two phases of BGP session establishment: TCP connection establishment 
phase and BGP session establishment phase. TCP connection must be established for 
BGP. This is called three-way handshake. The session is initially in Idle state. With 
TCP connection established, the session state changes to connect. After that, BGP 
enters OpenSent, OpenConfirm and Established states.[4][5] 
 
 
Fig. 2. BGP Session Establishment [5] 
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3   Related Work 
Security is a critical requirement when organizations connect their network to the 
Internet. However, BGP has many well-known security vulnerabilities. It is a protocol 
that multiple independent organizations use to exchange routes in the public 
internetwork. These organizations typically belong to different management domains 
or Autonomous Systems. When there are security vulnerabilities, the malicious actors 
will try to exploit for their benefits.  
Some of vulnerabilities are inherent to the basic BGP architecture and framework. 
The BGP protocol does not require strict integrity check and it does not enforce strict 
authentication of the handshake messages. Most of the update message does not need 
to authorize the senders.  
Malicious actors can purposely inject bad routes via crafted BGP messages to 
cause damage to the organization outbound traffic. Peers exchange prefixes with the 
best routes, and they are locally defined. The BGP route selection process and 
algorithm lack the proper security mechanism to detect and reject bad routes that sent 
from a bad neighbor. 
BGP works when the peering gateway routers operate in the correct operation 
model. When the operation is disrupted by a successful attack, the routing process can 
be degraded. Routers can be overwhelmed with routing messages. CPU and Memory 
resources can be exhausted. The correct operation depends on the integrity, 
authenticity and timeliness of the routing information BGP peers send. BGP routers 
are required to process, store and distribute this information in accordance with both 
the BGP specification and local routing policies.  
Detecting a security issue is difficult. There are many limitations to the ability of 
any practical security mechanism to monitor all BGP messages. Any external 
observer cannot easily determine if a neighboring router is operating BGP in the 
proper way. This is because monitoring such behaviors of a neighbor is beyond its 
local management or local AS. One example of the security issues is that BGP does 
not require sequence numbers. A bad router can send an UPDATE based on authentic 
but outdated information. [6] 
Some of the security issues can be un-intentional by a malfunctioning router or a 
bad configuration. A router advertising the wrong route to a prefix can damage or 
blackhole another organization network traffic. There are many incidents reported in 
the past about Internet meltdowns resulting in widespread loss of use for several days 
in some cases.  
The challenge is big, and the industry has been looking for effective solutions. 
There are many ongoing researches to secure BGP. BGP events can be collected and 
analyzed. BGP behavior can be observed, and good and normal behaviors are 
baselined. Abnormal behaviors can be detected, and the bad traffic can be rejected to 
stop causing more damages to the Internet. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published a set of 
security guidelines and recommendations to help organization to secure BGP. Access 
list Control, peer authentication, and prefix limits are some of the methods that have 
been recommended. To be more proactive in finding the threats, researchers are 
looking for more effective way to identify bad behavior before any harm has been 
done. [7] NIST provides a guidance for the evaluation of BGP anomaly detection. 
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Researchers have been using different techniques to detect any abnormal BGP 
behavior. They baseline the normal pattern and identify signatures of anomalies. 
Wavelet analysis is one of the techniques that can reveal the time-frequency behavior. 
The researchers take advantage of the strength of wavelet analysis in handling signal 
with scaling property and its ability to detect network anomaly and identify network 
wide anomalous events. Their method can detect network-wide events such as 
message volume surges caused by slammer worm attack [8]. 
Other researchers are studying the hierarchy of abnormal BGP Events. They want 
to classify the abnormal BGP events based on a hierarchy discovered by clustering 
method. They apply data mining techniques to build a tree-like hierarchy of abnormal 
BGP event classes [9]. 
4   Dataset 
The source data for this project will be collected from the Réseaux IP Européens 
Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) which stores public Internet routing data 
through the Routing Information Service (RIS). This data is made available for 
researchers without restrictions. This routing data is collected from approximately two 
dozen (exact count varies over time) Remote Route Collectors (RRC) around the 
globe. Prior to July of 2003, BGP messages were collected and stored at fifteen-
minute interval with the message sampling rate increased to every five minutes since 
that date. [10][11] 
 
 
Fig. 3. Data Collection and Parsing Steps 
The collected BGP update messages are stored in multi-threaded routing toolkit 
(MRT) format, which is described in RFC6396. The MRT formatted BGP update 
messages are converted into ASCII format by slightly modifying a module found on 
Github called mrtparse. This module is used as a part of the preprocessing steps as 
follows. First, the RIS raw data is collected via web crawl script. The next stage 
includes an iterative bash script to process all collected data files through mrtparse 
module, and the parsed outputs collected in batches. Finally, concatenation of all the 
message batches is performed in Python at which point the data is finally prepared for 
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exploratory data analysis (EDA), feature engineering, etc. The BGP remote route 
collector used for this project is RRC04 deployed at CERN Internet Exchange Point 
(CIXP), Geneva, Switzerland. Dependent variable for supervised learning will be 
based on known periods of Internet anomalies. [12] [13]     
An example record of the parsed output is shown in Figure 4. 
  
 
Fig. 4. Parsed MRT Record Example 
4.1   Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) 
The individual parsed messages as shown in Figure 3 are converted to long format, 
filtered to only include BGP UPDATE messages which leads to the following output 
fields. 
For withdrawn routes, the pipe delimited fields are: 
BGP protocol | timestamp | Withdraw or Announce | PeerIP | PeerAS | Prefix 
  For announcements, the pipe delimited fields are: 
BGP protocol | timestamp | Withdraw or Announce | PeerIP | PeerAS | Prefix | 
AS_PATH | Origin | Next_Hop | Local_Pref | MED | Community | AtomicAGG | 
AGGREGATOR           
Due to the massive size of the entire historical BGP dataset, sub-sampling was 
incorporated by collecting five-day windows of data surrounding known historical 
BGP event timestamps. The known event timestamps served as domain knowledge 
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indicator to determine if unsupervised anomaly detection was accurately detecting 
events. Initial EDA ruled out supervised training for this use case due to the 
requirement of inconsistent methods to apply dependent variable across multiple 
events. However, supervised training could be applied after anomaly detection to 
determine root cause (malicious, misconfiguration, outage, etc.), but that will not be 
addressed in this project. Below is a sample of the events used as true positive metric 
and their raw data size:  
 
• Nimda DoS Attack, 18 September 2001: 3,402,055 messages.    
• Slammer Worm, 25 January 2003: 2,351,501 messages.  
• TTNET BGP Misconfiguration, 24 December 2004: 434,671 messages.  
• Mosco Blackout Google, 7 May 2005: 1,646,471 messages.  
• TMnet BGP Misconfiguration, 12 June 2015: 19,982,317 messages. 
4.2   Data Cleaning and Imputation 
It was determined during EDA, that the parser output for the following fields were 
unusable null values of all observations in raw data. These columns were removed: 
 
| Next_Hop | Local_Pref | MED | Community | AtomicAGG | AGGREGATOR  
 
This resulted in a filtered raw data set approximately 28 million processed records.   
 
 
Fig. 5. Filtered Raw Data Sample 
 
Table 3. Raw Data Dictionary 
 
Column Name Description Values/data type 
PROTOCOL Protocol of the message BGP4MP 
RECORD Unique record ID int 
TIMESTAMP timestamp  datetime 
TYPE UPDATE message type A: Announcement  
W: Withdraw 
STATE: No routing change 
PEERIP Peer IP address string 
PEERAS Peer AS number string 
PREFIX IP address prefix string 
AS_PATH sequence of AS path string of AS numbers separated 
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segments by space 
ORIGIN Origin of the path 
information 
 
IGP: NLRI is 
interior to the originating AS 
EGP: NLRI learned via the EGP 
protocol  
INCOMPLETE: NLRI learned by 
some other means 
 
Next, the AS_PATH column was used to extract a new column showing the length 
of the AS path for that message. The remaining fields were then grouped by 
timestamp in 15-minute bins to create feature statistics based on computations during 
the time interval selected. NA values for these grouped bins were imputed to zero as 
the NA value just indicted none were counted in that timespan.  
Categorical features were expanded to include numeric counts by each class per 
time window. Statistical features were derived from the AS length for each time 
window. The resulting data frame for each 5-day event subsample is now pared down 




Fig. 6. Cleaned Data Output Columns Example 
 
In addition to the grouped features above, max prefix duplicate counts and 
grouping the messages by peer IP was added. This separate feature subset contains 
over 7000 rows with 13 features as shown below.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Grouped by IP Data Output Columns Example 
 
Both the ‘group by IP’ and ‘group by all’ datasets were used for modeling to not 
only compare models, but also to compare different approaches at feature 
engineering.  
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4.3   Feature Engineering 
The volume features are generated across each time interval as bulleted below with 
some of the bullets highlighting multiple features based on different statistical 
measures: 
 
• Count of announcements, withdrawals, and state message types over time.   
 
Fig. 8. Count of Announcements (left) and Withdrawals (right) vs. Time 
 
• Count of messages originated from Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), Exterior 
Gateway Protocol (EGP), and incomplete sources over time.  
 
Fig. 9. Count of EGP (left), IGP (middle), and incomplete (right) vs. Time 
 
• Average, maximum, and standard deviation of AS PATH steps (number of 
space delimited ASes in the AS PATH field) over time. 
 
Fig. 10. AS Length Mean (left), Max (middle), SD(right) vs. Time 
 
• Maximum count of announcements and withdrawal of unique NLRI prefixes 
during prescribed time interval.  
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 Fig. 11. maximum NLRI Prefix value counts vs. Time 
It is worth mentioning that some of these counts appear to correlate with event 
occurrences and anomaly detection may be possible with just a high pass filter. To get 
a fuller picture, however, will continue with cluster based unsupervised anomaly 
detection [14].  
4.4   Data Normalization 
Data normalization is an important part of data preparation when we are dealing with 
data features that have different ranges or units. 
Considering the factors of internet traffic growth and span of sampled dates across 
15 years, we need data normalization when comparing across these spans. Features 
related to message counts need to be scaled among subsets to reduce the bias caused 
by uneven data. Min-max scaling is applied for the normalization. (Figure 12: Total 
massage count: before and after min-max scaling)  
After min-max scaling, subsets are merged together. We use standardization on the 
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 Fig. 12. Total massage count: before and after min-max scaling 
5   Anomaly Detection 
Clustering based anomaly detection was utilized with known event timestamps to 
compare models, tune parameters, and decide feature engineering. The clustering 
models were unsupervised, but the known event timestamps help act as a domain 
knowledge agent to determine if the anomaly detection was accurate or not for each 
pass. This was attempted using K-means and DBSCAN clustering. 
 
Silhouette Coefficient 
Silhouette analysis is used in the model evaluation.  
The silhouette coefficient is a combination of two distances:  
a. The mean distance between point i to other points within the same cluster where 
i is assigned. 
b. The mean distance between point i to other points of the nearest cluster that i is 
not a part of. 
  
 
Silhouette coefficient shows how the points are close to the other points in the 
same cluster and how the points are distance from other clusters.  
The range of silhouette coefficient is from -1 to 1, 1 is the best result and -1 is the 
worst. Score of 0 indicates overlapping clusters. 
5.1   Unsupervised k-Means Clustering 
The k-means clustering algorithm is widely used in many fields including anomaly 
detection. It creates ‘k’ similar clusters of data points. Data instances that fall outside 
of these groups could potentially be marked as anomalies. Before we start k-Means 
clustering, we used elbow method to determine the optimal number of clusters. 
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 Fig. 13. K-means Cluster Elbow Curve 
Although the elbow curve shows marginal improvement after 9, we selected 14 
clusters for this project based on trial and error related to false positive counts. The 
underlying assumption in the clustering-based anomaly detection is that if we cluster 
the data, normal data will belong to clusters while anomalies will not belong to any 
clusters or belong to small clusters. We use the following steps to find and visualize 
anomalies [15]. 
• Calculate the distance between each point and its nearest centroid. The biggest 
distances are considered as anomaly. 
•  Set up a scoring method to provide information to the algorithm about the 
proportion of the outliers present in our data set.  
• Calculate ‘number of outliers’ parameter using scoring method. 
• Set threshold as the minimum distance of these outliers. 
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 Fig. 14. Anomaly Detection Using k-Means Clustering 
The results are a detection of 7 anomalies across 5 known event periods. The 
anomalies are shown on the graph as the red dots and the graph encompasses 25 days 
of normalized event activity. The silhouette score for this output was 0.652 and the 
number of clusters used was 14. This is a very good result as each anomaly was 
detected and the low number of actual anomalies listed shows an aversion to false 
positives. The model and settings used here are also resilient to over-selecting 
anomalies during ‘quiet times’, but still did predict a few false positives.   
5.2   Unsupervised DBSCAN Clustering 
DBSCAN, or density based spatial clustering of applications with noise, is a clustering 
algorithm that finds core samples of high density and expands clusters from them. It is 
good for data which contains clusters of similar density. Compared to centroid-based 
clustering like k-Means, density-based clustering works by identifying “dense” 
clusters of points, allowing it to learn clusters of arbitrary shape and identify outliers 
in the data.[16] 
• Two main parameters of DBSCAN need to be set and then thresholding 
applied to their results to indicate anomalies: 
o eps - The maximum distance between two data points to be 
considered in the same neighborhood.  
o min_samples - The number of samples (or total weight) in a 
neighborhood for a point to be considered as a core point. [17] 
o Set threshold as the proportion of noise points. 
o Select eps and min_samples based on Silhouette scores and 
proportion of noise points 
• Data points labeled as noise points by DBSCAN are considered anomaly. 
16
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Fig. 15. Anomaly Detection Using DBSCAN Clustering 
 
DBSCAN successfully detected anomalies during these event timelines. A total of 
207 obeservations are detected as anomalies by DBSCAN with settings of eps = 3.5 
and min_samples = 80. The Silhouette Coefficient is 0.836. DBSCAN is less resilient 
to outliers than k-means during non-event times. [18]      
6   Machine Learning Pipeline Proposal 
Integrating machine learning models into big data pipeline would ultimately be the 
goal of implementing a BGP anomaly trigger to make the insights actionable in near-
real time. Up to this point in the document, the steps in the cluster analysis engine 
development on Figure 1 have been performed. The next steps to implement machine 
learning pipeline as shown on the bottom of Figure 1 would be as follows. The 
following steps are a proposal for future work in this domain. The assumption is a big 
data architecture is in place. The high-level steps are as follows: 
 
1. Data is collected via job scheduler (cron, Oozie, etc.).    
2. Script to create features (reproduce static feature creation output exactly) 
is implemented (Python, Spark, Flink). 
3. Features pushed to storage for future review/use (HDFS, etc.). 
4. Script to apply model(s) (Python, Spark, Flink). 
a. Also include revision control application to serialize the model 
with versioning. 
b. Chance to have feedback loop to parameterize model based on 
latest results (future works).  
17
Edwards et al.: Border Gateway Protocol Anomaly Detection
Published by SMU Scholar,
5. Publish anomalies (Kafka topic, HDFS, etc.). 
6. Dashboard, Trigger (email, API to other system, etc.) each anomaly or 
groups of anomalies (ELK stack, Splunk, etc.). 
7   Ethics  
This project is not deeply affected by ethics issues as the BGP message data used is 
made available already for public use. If we had used private BGP syslog data, that 
information may have had specific customer IP addresses that would have required 
masking or concealing before statistical analysis. If using internal router logs, a 
private company could correlate neighbor IP information with external data to create 
many different BGP related triggers just based on correlations and high pass filters. 
These could include but are not limited to single customer all circuits idle, single 
router/card/interface all circuits idle, idle to established continuous flapping, etc. The 
risk of reverse engineering the IP addresses from the masks may carry too much of a 
negative to use this information outside of internal company systems.  
8   Conclusions 
The work covered in this paper has shown collection, parsing, feature engineering 
of public BGP message data and developing statistical/temporal features to apply 
unsupervised learning techniques. The most effective model for this iteration was k-
means with a silhouette score of .652 using 14 clusters. As an unsupervised learning 
model, domain knowledge and inspection of the results determined this. False 
positives remained too high with DBSCAN methods attempted.  
Next steps can include implementing proposed machine learning pipeline to apply 
the optimal model and parameters to near real-time data with an output to identify and 
alert network operations center of probable BGP anomalies. Future work can focus on 
several areas. Modeling improvements to reduce false positives can be implemented 
via new data sources to correlate, different techniques such as supervised learning, 
neural networks, hidden Markov model pattern comparisons, and new feature 
engineering. Router syslogs with BGP session establishment messages could be a 
huge boost in possible triggered alerts, even ones simply based on high pass filters as 
the state machine for this process has several possible event outcomes even on 
individual circuit basis.  
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